Demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) requires an assessment of the Iong-term performance of the disposal system. Scenario development is one starting point of this assessment, and generates inqui~about the present state and fiture evolution of the disposal system. Scenario development consists of four tasks: (i) identi&ing and classifying features, events and processes (FEPs), (ii) screening FEPs according to well-defined criten~(iii) forming scenarios (combinations of FEPs) in the context of regulatory performance criteria and (iv) specifying of scenarios for consequence amdysis. The development and screening of a comprehensive FEP list provides assurance that the identification of significant processes and events is complete, that potential interactions between FEPs are not overlooked, and that responses to possible questions are available and well documented. Two basic scenarios have been identified for the WIPP: undisturbed performance (IIP) and disturbed performance (DP). The UP scenario is used to evaluate compliance with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Individual Dose standards and accounts for all natural and waste-and repository-induced FEPs that survive the screening process. The DP scenario is required for assessment calculations for the EPA's cumulative release standard (Containment Requirements, 40 CFR~191.13) and accounts for disruptive future human events, which have an uncertain probability of occurrence, in addition to the UP FEPs.
INTRODUCTION
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) will be used for the disposal of transuranic waste from defense programs of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The WIPP facility is located 42 km east of the town of Carlsbad in southeastern New Mexico. The repository is located 655 m underground in a Permian bedded salt formation.
In October 1996, the DOE applied to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for certification of the WIPP'S compliance with the relevant radioactive waste disposal standards (40 CFR Part 191)1 and criteria (40 CFR Part 194)2 that govern post-closure safety? Demonstrating compliance with these standards and criteria requires an assessment of the long-term performance of the disposal system. For analysis, the universe of all possible occurrences within the 10,000-year regulatory time ii-arne is divided into subsets of similar future occurrences, which are defined as scenarios.a Because a scenario is defined simply as a subset of futures with similar occurrences, it does not have a specific size. In general, applying the term scenario for larger subsets of fitures is useful in discussions of concepts, whereas applying the term scenario for smaller subsets of fitures is usefid when presenting scenario consequences. This paper is concerned with concepts; other papers in this volume discuss scenario consequences. u
The Containment Requirements of 40 CFR Part 191 (il 191.13 ) set limits on the probability that cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years after disposal will exceed certain values. The EPA defines the accessible environment to be D(1) the atmosphere, (2) land surfaces, (3) surface waters, (4) oceans, and (5) all of the lithosphere that is beyond the controlled areaEl (Cl 191. 12[k] ). The definition of the controlled area plays an important role in scenario development, particularly in the consideration of fiture human actions. For the WIPP, the controlled area consists ofa41 -km2 area overlying the repository.
The EPA has provided criteria concerning the scope of performance assessments in 40 CFR Part 191 and in the WIPP-specific compliance criteri~40 CFR Part 194:
a Note that scenarios u'ouid not necessarily have to be defined as subsets of simiIar Mure occurrences, but defining a scenario as a subset of similar Mmres confers a practical advantage because the consequences of futures falling within one scenario can be calculated with the same model configuration. 1s Any compliance application(s) shall include information which:
(1) Identifies aH potential processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events that may occur during the re=gdatory time frame and may affect the disposal system;
(2) Identifies the processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events included in performance assessments; and (3) Documents why any processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events identified pursuant to paragraph(e)(]) of this section were not included in performance assessment results provided in any compliance application.
Evaluation of the consequences of scenarios begins with the determination of the scenarios to be analyzed. The DOE has determined scenarios through a formal process similar to that proposed by
Cranwell et al.,~and used in preliminary performance assessments for the WIPP.5-b This process has four steps:
(1) FEPs (features, events, and processes) potentially relevant to the WIPP are identified and classified. u (2) Certain FEPs are eliminated according to well-defined screening criteria because they are not important or not relevant to the performance of the WIPP.
(3)
Scenarios are formed from the remaining FEPs in the context of regulatory performance criteria.
(4) Scenarios we specified for consequence analysis.
This paper illustrates the DOE's application of this methodology for the Compliance Certification
Application (CCA) for the WIPP.3 Steps (1) and (2) of the scenario development process are destiribed in Section 2; Steps (3) and (4) are described in Section 3.
Scenario development for a particular disposal concept depends on the purpose of the assessment and the barrier system that isolates the radioactive waste after disposal. For the WIPP, long-term containment of wastes will be provided by a multibarrier system that comprises three principal components:s . .
(i)
(ii) (iii 2
2.1
Engineered barriers (magnesium oxide [MgO] backfill, shaft, drift, and panel seal systems).
Waste canisters will be crushed by salt creep relatively soon after the repository is decommissioned; other components of the repository system will evolve gradually, and will provide a barrier iinction over the regulatory period. In particular, long-term performance of the shaft seal systems,' and chemical conditioning provided by the MgO backfill are important in limiting releases.
The 600-m thick halite host rock (Salado Formation) . This unit has extremely low permeability when undisturbe~and will not provide a pathway for significant contaminant transport to the accessible environment.
The geologic units underlying and overlying the Salado. Given a breach of the %lado by a future borehole, significant delay and retardation of radionuclides will occur in units overlying or underlying this Formation. The historical focus of the project has been strongly on the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation, which is the most transrnissive unit overlying the repository. However, the DOE accounts for additional hydrological units above and below the repository in petiormance assessment calculations.
IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING OF FEATURES, EVENTS, AND " PROCESSES

Identification of FEPs
The first step of the scenario development procedure is the identification and classification of FEPs potentially relevant to the performance of the disposal system. In constructing a comprehensive list of FEPs for the WIPP, the DOE followed several avenues of inquiry, including (i) review of FEP lists developed in other disposal programs, (ii) review of WIPP project literature, and (iii) reviews by, and documented meetings with, WIPP project staff, WIPP project stakeholders,b and the EPA.
This work is summarized here.
Catalogs of FEPs have been developed in several national radioactive waste disposal programs, as well as internationally. As a checklist for the development of a site-specific FEP list for the WIPP, b WIPP project stakeholders contributing to the process included the EnvironmentalEvaluations Group, the State of New Mexico Attorney General's office, the Southwest Research and Information Center, Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping. Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, and members of the public.
the DOE assembled a list of potentially relevant FEPs using a set of nine existing FEP lists developed by different programs for different disposal concepts, including a bedded salt concept (see Table 1 ). The same set of FEP lists had been used by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) in developing a FEP list in Sweden.7 This compilation of FEP lists formed the best documented and most comprehensive checklist available at the time the work was conducted.= This checklist was used as a starting poipt to derive the comprehensive site-specific CCA FEP list.
The following steps were taken:
. Several FEPs were renamed to be consistent with terms used to describe specific WIPP processes.
Additional detail was added to the FEP list in some areas where it was felt necessary to increase the clarity of the analysis. For example, the single FEP Lldissolution!J was replaced by the FEPs~deep dissolution,El Ellateral dissolution,~and L!shallow dissolution,~all of which represent distinct processes at the WIPP.
FEPs were reclassified under the major headings hTatural, Waste-and RepositoryInduce& and Human-Initiated, with each of these major headings being given consistent subheadings according to a top-down structured breakdown of knowledge about the WIPP (see Table 2 ). M
. Finally, as part of the revisions to produce the fird CCA FEP list, the drafl CCA list was reviewed by project sM, stakeholders, and the EPA, as part of the DOE~s efforts to ensure comprehensiveness and clarity of the final list. The CCA FEP list is included in Chapter 6 and Appendix SCR of the CCA.3
Criteria for Screening FEPs and Categorizing Retained FEPs
The purpose of FEP screening was to identi~those FEPs on the CCA FEP list that should be accounted for in performance assessment calculations, and those FEPs that need not be considered further. The DOEPS process of removing FEPs from consideration in performance assessment calculations involved the structured application of three screening criteria. The criteria used to screen out FEPs were explicit regulatory exclusion (SO-R), probability (SO-P), and/or consequence (SO-C). As discussed in Section 2.2.1, all three criteria are derived from regtdatory requirements.
FEPs not screened as SO-R SO-P, or SO-C were retained for inclusion in performance assessment calculations and were classified as undisturbed performance (UP) or disturbed performance (DP) ancVor probability of occurrence of particular FEPs and, in so doing, allowed for some FEPs to be eliminated born consideration. Section 2.5 describes the regulatory screening criteria that pertain to the human-initiated events and processes that need to be considered.
Probability of occurrence of a FEP Ieading to significant release of radionuclides (SO-P). Low-
probability events can be excluded on the basis of the criterion provided in 40 CFR D 194.32(d), which states that Dperformance assessments need not consider processes and events tha~have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.Cl In practice, for most FEPs screened out on the basis of low probability of occu&ence, it has not been possible for the DOE to estimate a meaningful quantitative probability.
In the absence of quantitative probability estimates, a qualitative argument was provided in the CCA. In some cases the effkcts of tie occurrence of a particular event or process, although not necessarily insignifican~can be shown to lie within the range of uncertainty of another FEP already accounted for in the performance assessment calculations. In such cases the event or process may be considered to be included in performance assessment calculations implicitly, within the range of uncertainty associated with the included FEP.
The distinctions between the SO-R, SO-P, and SO-C screening classifications are summarized in Figure 1 . Althous@ some FEPs could be eliminated from performance assessment calculations on the basis of more than one criterio~the most practical screening criterion was used for classification.
In particular, a regulatory screening classification was used in preference to a probability or a consequence screening classification, as illustrated in Figure 1 . FEPs that have not been screened out %ased on any one of the three criteria have been accounted for in performance assessment calculations.
2.2.2
Undisturbed Performance (UP) FEPs
FEPs classified as UP are accounted for in calculations of undisturbed performance of the disposal system (see Section 3-1 
Disturbed Performance (DP) FEPs
FEPs classified as DP are accounted for only in the assessment calculations for disturbed performance, required to evaluate compliance with the Containment Requirements (see Section 3.2).
The DP FEPs that remain following the screening process relate to the potential disruptive effects of future drilling and mining events in the WIPP controlled area.
Screening of Natural FEPs
Consistent with 40 CFR 0 194.32(d) , the DOE screened out several natural FEPs from peflormance assessment calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence at or near the WIPP site. In particular, natural events for which there is no evidence of occurrence within the Delaware Basin were screened out on this basis. In this analysis, the probabilities of occurrence of these events was assumed to be zero. Quantitative, nonzero probabilities for such events, based on numbers of occurrences, cannot be ascribed without considering regions much larger than the Delaware Basin, thus neglecting established geological understanding of the events and processes that occur within particular geographical provinces. No disruptive natural FEPs that could result in the creation of new pathways or significant alteration of existing pathways have a probability of greater than 104 of occurring during the 10,000-year regulatory time frame-For the WIPP setting, this is also true w over much longer periods (105 -10b years).
In considering the overall geological setting of the Delaware Basin, the DOE eliminated many FEPs from performance assessment calculations on the basis of low consequence. Events and processes that have had little effect on the characteristics of the region in the past are expected to be of low consequence for the period of regulatory interest.
Screening of Waste-and Repository-Induced FEPs
The waste-and repository-induced FEPs are those that relate specifically to the waste material, waste containers, shaft seals, MgO backfill, panel closures, repository structures, and investigation boreholes. All FEPs related to radionuclide chemistry and radionuclide migration have been included in this catego~. FEPs related to radionuclide transport resulting from Mure borehole intersections of the WIPP excavation have also been included in this category.
The DOE screened out many FEPs in this category on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. For example, the DOE has shown that the heat generated by , radioactive decay of the emplaced RH-and CH-TRU waste will not result in significant thermal convection, thermal stresses and strains, or thermally induced chemical perturbations within the disposal system. Also, hydration of the emplaced concrete seals and MgO chemical conditioner will be exothermic, but the DOE has shown that the heat generated will not have a significant effect on the performance of the disposal system.
Other waste-and repository-induced FEPs were eliminated from performance assessment calculations on the basis of beneficial effect on the performance of the disposal system, when necessary to sirnpli~the analysis.
Waste-and reposito~-induced FEPs eliminated on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years are generally those for which no mechanisms have been identified that could result in their occurrence within the disposal system. Such FEPs include explosions resulting from nuclear criticality, and the development of large-scale reduction-oxidation fronts.
Screening of Human-initiated Events and Processes
Assessments of compliance with the Containment Requirements in 40 CFR 0191.13 require consideration of Ch.11significant processes and events~including human-initiated FEPs. For the WIPP, human-initiated events and processes drive the identification of disturbed performance scenarios.
The scope of performance assessments is clarified with respect to human-initiated events and processes in 40 CFR Ll 194.32. At 40 CFR El 194.32(a) the EPA states that lJPefiormance assessments shaIl consider natural processes and events, mining, deep drilling, and shallow drilling that may affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frarne.0 Thus, performance assessments must include consideration of human-initiated FEPs relating to mining and drilling activities that might take place during the 10,000-year regulato~time fiarne. In particular, performance assessments must consider the potential effects of such activities that might take place within the controlled area at a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to eliminate completely the possibility of human intrusion.
Further criteria concerning the scope of performance assessments are provided at 40 CFR Z 194.32(c):
Performance assessments shall include an analysis of the effects on the disposal system of any activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to disposal and are expected to occur in the vicinity of the disposal system soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but shall not be limited to, existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can be reasonably expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that maybe used for fluid injection activities.
Thus, performance assessments must include consideration of all human-initiated FEPs relating to activities that have taken place or are reasonably expected to take place outside the controlled area in the near future.
In order to implement the criteria in 40 CFR •l 194.32 relating to the scope of pefiormance assessments, tie DOE divided human activities into three categories. Distinctions are made between
(1) human activities that are currently taking place and those that took place prior to the submission of the CCA, (2) human activities that might be initiated in the near fiture after submission of the CCA, and (3) human activities that might be initiated after repository closure. The first two categories of FEPs are considered under undisturbed petiormance, and FE% in the third category lead to disturbed performance conditions.
(1) Historical and current human activities include resource extraction activities that have historically taken place and are currently taking place outside the controlled ar~a. These activities are of potential si=tificance insofar as they could affect geological, hydrological, or geochemical conditions within or outside the disposal system. Current human activities taking place within the controlled area are essentially those associated with development of the WIPP repository. Historical activities include existing boreholes.
(2) Near-fiture human activities include resource extraction activities that maybe expected to occur outside the controlled area based on existing plans and leases. Thus, the near fi.tture includes the expected lives of existing mines and oil and gas fk?lds, and the expected lives of new mines and oil and gas fields that the DOE anticipates will be developed based on existing plans and leases. These activities are of potential significance insofm as they could affect geological, hydrological, or geochemical conditions within or outside the disposal system. The only human activities that are expected to occur within the controlled area in the near future are those associated with development of the WIPP repository. The DOE assumes that any activity that is expected to be initiated in the near future, based on existing
plans and leases, will be initiated prior to repository closure. Activities initiated prior to repository closure are assumed to continue for their expected economic lifetime.
Future human activities include activities that might be initiated within or outside the controlled area after repository closure. This includes drilling and mining for resources within the disposal system at a time when institutional controls cannot be akwmed to eliminate completely the possibility of such activities. Future human activities could influence the transport of contaminants within and outside the disposal system by directly removing waste horn the disposal system, or altering the geological, hydrological, or geochernical conditions within or outside the disposal system.
For the WIPP, performance assessments must consider the potential effects of historical, currenñ ear-future, and fiture human activities on the performance of the disposal system. The EPA requires that performance assessments Zkhall assume that the characteristics of the future remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared.~This criterion was applied to eliminate the following human-initiated FEPs horn perforniance assessment calculations:
. Drilling associated with geothermal energy production, hydrocarbon storage, and archaeological
investigations. 4
q Excavation activities associated with tunneling and construction of underground facilities (fo; example, storage, disposal, and accommodation). . Changes in agricultural practices.
q Demographic change, urban developments, and technological developments.
'Screening of historical, current, and near-future human activities
The observational data obtained as part of WIPP site characterization reflect any effects of historical and current human activities in the vicinity of the WIPP, such as groundwater extraction and oil and gas production. Historical and current human activities were either modeled or found to be of low consequence to long-term performance.
Historical, curren~and near-future human activities could affect WIPP site characteristics subsequent to the submission of the CCA, and could influence the performance of the disposal system. The hydrogeological impacts of historical, current and near-fiture potash mining outside the controlled area were accounted for in calculations of the undisturbed performance of the disposal system. Other human-initiated FEPs expected to occur in the Delaware Basin were eliminated from assessment calculations on the basis of low consequence to the pefiormance of the disposal system.
Screening of future human activities
Performance assessments must consider the effects of fi.tture human activities on the performance of the disposal system. The EPA has provided criteria relating to fiture human activities in 40 CFR El 194.32(a), which limits the scope of consideration of fiture" human actions in petiormance assessments to mining and drilling.
Criteria concerning fiture mining: The EPA provides additional criteria concerning the type of fdure mining that should be considered by the DOE in 40 CFR II 194.32(b):
Assessmerm of mining effects maybe limked to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal system from excavation mining for natural resources. Mining shall be assumed to occur with a one m 100 probability in each century of the regulatory time hrne. Performance asses~ments shall assume that mineral deposits of those resources, similar in quaiity and type to those resources currently extracted fFom the Delaware Basin, will be completely removed fkom the controlled area during the centtuy in which such mining is randomly calculated to occur. Complete removal of such mineral resources shaH be assumed to occur only once during the regulatory time fiarne.
Thus, considemtion of fi.tture mining maybe limited to mining within the controlled area at the locations of resources that are similar in quality and type to those currently extracted from the Delaware Basin. Potash is the only resource that has been identified within the controlled area in quality similar to that currently mined from underground deposits elsewhere in the Delaware Basin.
Within the controlled area the McNutt Member of the Salado Formation provides the only potash of appropriate quality to justifj mining. The hydrogeological impacts of future potash mining within the controlled area were accounted for in calculations of the disturbed petiorrnance of the disposal system. Consistent with 40 CFR O 194.32(b) , all economically recoverable resources in the vicinity of the disposal system (outside the controlled area) were assumed to be extracted in the near future.
Crireria concerningfuture drilling: With respect to consideration of Mure ddling, in the preamble to 40 CFR Part 194, the EPA Ureasoned that while the resources drilled for today may not be the same as those drilled for in the finure, the present rates at which these boreholes are drilled can nonetheless provide an estimate of the future rate at which boreholes will be drilled. The EPA provides an additional criterion that limits the severity of human intrusion scenarios that must be considered in pefiorrnance assessments. In 40 CFR u 194.33(b) (1) the EPA states that u~advertent and~te~ttent in~ion by drilling for resources (other than those resources provided by the waste in the disposal system or engineered barriers designed to isolate such waste) is the most severe human intrusion scenario.~Thus, human intrusion scenarios involving deliberate intrusion need not be considered in performance assessments. Similarly, the majority of waste-and repository-induced FEPs retained for scenario construction are considered as part of the undisturbed performance scenario. Again; the only exceptions are four
FEPs exclusively related to the potential effects of fiture deep drilling within the controlled area.
Several FEPs relating to human activities that are retained for scenario construction are not disruptive to the disposal system and are, therefore, considered in,undisturbed performance. For example, potash mining outside the controlled area does not constitute a disruption of the dkpsal system. However, the retained fixture human-initiated FEPs occurring inside the controlled area do present potential disruptions to the disposal sy~em and have been used to develop disturbedperformance scenarios.
In total, 67 undisturbed petiormance FEPs have been identified (TabIe 3). Among the most significant FEPs that will tiect the undisturbed performance within the disposal system are excavation-induced fracturing, gas generation, salt creep, and MgO backfill in the disposal rooms:
. The excavation of the repository and the consequent changes in the stress field in the rock surrounding the excavated opening will create a disturbed rock zone (DRZ) immediately adjacent to excavated openings. The DRZ will exhibit mechanical and hydrological properties different than those of the intact rock. M q Organic material in the waste may degrade because of microbial activity, and brine will corrode metals in the waste and waste containers. Gas generation from either or both processes may result in pressures sufficient to both maintain or develop fkactures and change the fluid flow pattern around the waste disposal region.
. At the repository depth, salt creep will tend to heal fractures and reduce the permeability of the DRZ and the crushed salt component of the long-term shaft seals to near that of the host rock salt.
q MgO baclcfW to be emplaced in the disposal rooms will react with carbon dioxide (C02)and maintain mildly alkaline conditions. Corrosion of metals in the waste and waste containers will maintain reducing conditions. These effects will control radionuclide volubility.
Radionuclides can become mobile as a result of waste dissolution and colloid generation following brine flow into the disposal rooms. Colloids maybe generated from the waste (humics, mineral fragments,and a~tinide intrinsicCo]loids)or from other sources (humics, mineral fragments, and microbes).
Conceptually, there are several pathways for radionuclide transport within the undisturbed disposal system that may result in releases to the accessible environment (FiGWe 3). Contaminated brine may move away from the waste-disposal panels if pressure within the panels is elevated by the generation of gas from corrosion or microbial degradation. Radionuclide transport may occur laterally, through the anhydrite interbeds toward the subsurface boundary of the accessible environment in the SaIado, or through access drifts or anhydrite interbeds, primarily Marker Bed 139 (MB 139), to the base of the shafls. In the latter case, if the pressure gradient between the panels and overlying strata is sufficient, then contaminated brine may move up the shafts. As a resul~radionuclides may be transported directly to the ground stiace, or they may be transported laterdy away from the sha.fis, through permeable strata (such as the Culebra Member of the Rustler Formation), toward the subsurface boundary of the accessible environment. These conceptual pathways are shown in For evaluation of the consequences of disturbed pefiormance, the DOE defined the mining scenario, M, the 'deep drilling scenario, E, and a mining and drilling scenario, ME. These scenarios are described in the following sections.
The disturbed performance mining scenario (M)
The disturbed performance mining scenario, M, involves fiture mining within the controlled area.
Consistent with the criteria stated by the EPA in 40 CFR Z 194.32 (b), for performance assessment calculations, the effects of potential fiture mining within the controlled area are limited to changes in hydraulic conductivity of the Culebra that result from subsidence. Radionuclide transport may be affected in the M scenario if a head gradient between the waste-disposal panels and the Culebra causes brine contaminated with radionuclides to move from the waste-disposal panels to the base of the shafts and up the shafts to the Culebra. The changes in the Culebra transmissivity field may tiect the =te and direction of radionuclide transport within the Culebra. Features of the M scenario are illustrated in Figure 4 .
The three disturbed performance FEPs labeled M in Table 4 relate to the occurrence and effects of Mure mining. The modeling system used for the M scenario is similar to that developed for the undisturbed performance scenario, but with a modified Culebra transrnissivity field within the controlled area to account for the effects of mining.
The disturbed performance deep drilling scenario (E)
The disturbed pefiormance deep drilling scenario, E, involves at least one deep drilling event that intersects the waste disposal region. The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in performance assessments in 40 CFR 0 194.33(c):
Performance assessments shall document that in analyzing the consequences of drilling events, the%epartment assumed that
(1) Future drilling practices and technology will remain consistent with practices in the IMaware Basin at the time a compliance application is prepared. Such I%ure drilling practices shall include, but shall not be limited to: the types and amounts of drilling fluids; borehole depths, diameters, and seals; and the fiction of such boreholes that are sealed by humans; and (2) Natural processes will degrade or otherwise affect the capability of boreholes to transmit fluids over the regulatory time flame.
Consistent with these criteri~there are several pathways for radionuclides to reach the accessible environment in the E scenario. During the period before any deep drdling intersects the waste, potential release pathways are identical to those in the undisturbed performance scenario.
If a borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, releases to the accessible environment may occur as material entrained in the circulating drilling fluid is brought to the surface. Particulate waste brou~@ to the surface may include cuttings, cavings, and spallings-Cuttings are the materials cut by the drill bit as it passes through waste. Cavings are the materials eroded by the drilling fluid Table 4 relate to the occurrence and effects of an El drilling event. A borehole that intersects a waste panel but does not penetrate a Castile brine reservoir has been designated an E2
event. The 18 disturbed pefiormance FEPs labeled E2 in Table 4 relate to the occurrence and effects of an E2 drilling event.
In order to evaluate the consequences of future deep drilling, the DOE has divided the E scenario into three drilling subscenarios, El, E2 and E1E2, distinguished by the number of El and E2 drilling events that are assumed to occur in the regulato~time frame. These subscenarios are described in order of increasing complexity in the following sections.
The E2 Scenario: The E2 scenario is the simplest scenario for inadvertent human intrusion into a waste disposal panel. In this scenario, a panel is penetrated by a drill bi~cuttings, cavings, spallings, and brine flow releases may OCCW, and brine flow may occur in the borehole after it is plugged and abandoned. Sources for brine that may contribute to long-ten flow up the abandoned borehole are the Salado or, under certain conditions, the units above the Salado. An E2 scenario may involve more than one E2 drilling event. Featiues of the E2 scenario are illustrated in Figure 5 . A modeling system has been developed to evaluate the consequences of an E2 scenario during which single or multiple E2 events occur.
The El Scenario: Any scenario with a single inadvertent penetration of a waste panel that also penetrates a Castile brine reservoir is called El. Features of this scenario are illustrated in Figure 6 .
Sources of brine in the El scenario are the brine resexwoir, the Salado and, under certain conditions, the units above the Salado. However, the brine reservoir is conceptually the dominant source of brine in this scenario. The model conf@ration developed for the El scenario is used t: evaluate the consequences of futures that have only one El event per panel. A fiture during which more than one E 1 event occurs in a single panei is described as an El E2 scenario.
The ElE2 Scenario: The El E2 scenario is defined as aIl fitures that have multiple penetrations of a waste panel of which at least one intrusion is an E 1 type. One case of this scenario, with a single El event and a singIe E2 event penetrating the same panel, is illustrated in Figure 7 . However, the El E2 scenario can include many possible combinations of intrusion times, locations, and types of event (E 1 or E2)-The sources of brine in this scenario are those listed for the E 1 scenario, and multiple E 1-type sources may be present. The El E2 scenario potentially has a flow path not present in the E 1 or E2 scenarios: flow from an El borehole through the waste to another borehole. This flow path has the potential to (i) bring large quantities of brine in direct contact with waste and (ii) provide a less restrictive path for this brine to flow to the units above the Salado (via multiple boreholes) compared to either the El or E2 individual scenarios. Both the presence of brine reservoirs and the potential for flow through the waste to other boreholes make this scenario different in terms of potential consequences from combinations of E2 boreholes. The extent to which flow occurs between boreholes, as estimated by modeling, determines whether combinations of E 1 and E2 boreholes at specific locations in the repository should be treated as El E2 scenarios or as independent El and E2 scenarios in the consequence analysis. Because of the number of possible combinations of drilling events, the modeling configuration for the El E2 scenario differs in significant ways from the model conilguration used for evaluating El and E2 scenarios.
The disturbed performance mining and deep drilling scenario (ME)
Mining in the WIPP site (the M scenario) and deep drilling (the E scenario) may both occur in the fiture. The DOE calls a fhture in which both of these events occur the ME scenario. The occurrence of both mining and deep drilling does not create processes in addition to those already described separately for the M and E scenarios. For example, the occurrence of mining does not influence any of the interactions between deep boreholes and the repository or brine reservoirs. As well, the occurrence of drilling does not impact the effects of mining on Culebra hydrogeology. The difference between the M and E scenarios considered separately and the ME scenario is that the combination of borehole transport to the Culebra (E) and a transmissivity field impacted by mining (M) may result in more rapid transport of radionuclides to the accessible environment. For example, because the M scenario does not include drilling, the only pathway for radionuclides to"reach the Culebra is up the sealed shafts. For clarity in describing computational results, the ME scenario was subdivided in the CCA according to the types of deep drilling subscenarios into the MEl scenario (M and El), the ME2 scenario (M and E2), and the ME1E2 scenario (M and E1E2).
The system used for modeling flow and transport in the Culebra for the ME scenario is similar to that used for the E scenario. However, in the ME scenario the Culebra transmissivity field is modified to account for the effects of mining within the controlled area.
Scenarios Retained for Performance Assessment
The FEPs that remain after screening are accounted for in petiorrnance assessment calculations either through explicit representation in the equations that form the mathematical models or implicitly through the specification of parameter values used as input to the performance assessment codes. Tables 3 and 4 The modeling systems used to evaluate the consequences of the undisturbed and disturbed peflormance scenarios are discussed in other papers in this volurne.ls> 19 For consequence analysis, the scenarios and subscenarios described here were fbrther subdivided into modeling scenarios (termed S,). The modeling scenarios are distinguished by, for example, the time of occurrence of disruptive events, and are generated by probabilistic sampling of selected processes and events.
Conclusions
A robust and tested methodology has been applied for identi&ing and screening FEPs, and for combining FEPs to form scenarios for consequence analysis. This paper has dewribed the methodology and its application to the WIPP. The methodology consists of (i) identi&ing and classifying FEPs, (ii) screening FEPs according to well-defined criteri~(iii) forming scenarios (combinations of FEPs) in the context of regulatory performance criteri~and (iv) specification of scenarios for consequence analysis.
The procedure used to derive and build cotildence in the comprehensiveness and relevance of the CCA FEP list included the use of available international experience in assembling FEP lists, combined with extensive documented review of the WIPP FEP list within the project, and by stakeholders and the EPA. FEPs were eliminated from performance assessment calculations using criteria "defmed by regulatio~including explicit regulatory exclusio~probability of occurrence over 10,000 years, and/or consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The development and screening of a comprehensive FEP list provides assurance that the identification of significant processes and events is complete, that potential interactions between FEPs are not overlooked, and that responses to possible questions are available and well documented. 
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Undisturbed performance FEPs and their treatment in performance assessment calculations
FEP Categorization
I
Flow through abandoned boreholes BorehoIe-induced g,eochemical changes Excavation-induced flow Changes in groundwater flow due to mining P Accounted for in SECOTP2D in the Culebra P Potash mining outside the controlled area is accounted for by modi@ng the Culebra transmissivity fields used by SECOFL2D
Notes:
' C FEP treated through explicit representation in the equations implemented in the performance assessment code. P FEP treated through the specification of parametem values.
bBRAGFLO, SECOFL2D, SECOTP2D, NUTS, and PANEL are codes used directly in pefiormance assessment calculations. These codes and their inter-relationships are described in Reference 17. Notes: ' M Mining within the controlled area. El Deep drilling that intersects the waste disposal region and a brine reservoir in the Castile. E2 Deep drilling that intersects a waste disposal panel. b C FEP treated through explicit representation in the equations implemented in the performance assessment codes. P FEP treated through the specification of parameters values. c BRAGFLO, CCDFGF, CUTTINGS_S, SECOFL2D, and SECOTP2D are codes used directly in performance assessment calculations. These codes and their inter-relationships are described in Reference 17. d Deep drilling means those drilling events in the Delaware Basin that reach or exceed a depth of 2,150 feet below the surface relative to where such ddling occurred. calculations have a probability of occurrence of one. Disruptive events used to form disturbed petiorrnance scenarios have an uncertain probability of occurrence.
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